




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ABSTRACT

This paper uses a survey experiment to assess what individuals understand about election fraud and under what circumstances they see it as a problem. I argue that political parties are central to answering both these questions. Results from the 2011 CCES survey suggest respondents are able to differentiate between the relative incentives of Democrats and Republicans where fraud tactics are concerned, but whether voters see these tactics as problematic is heavily influenced by partisan bias. The results show little support for the notion that partisan ideology drives fraud assessments, and suggest support for the idea that individual concerns for fraud are shaped a desire for their preferred candidate to win. These results offer insights that might be applied more broadly to questions of perceptions of electoral integrity and procedural fairness in democracies.

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Since the 2000 presidential election, with controversies in the state of Florida and the Supreme Court's ruling in *Bush v. Gore*, the specter of election fraud has gained a place of prominence in questions of election administration in the United States. In more recent elections these concerns have crystallized around the issue of voter identification—with those in favor of more stringent identification requirements pointing to bloated and inaccurate voter registers as hotbeds for voter fraud, while opponents of such measures criticize them as administrative tools of voter suppression.¹ The historical record is rich with cases of electoral malfeasance in the U.S., with examples of both voter suppression (Kousser, 1974, Cox and Kousser, 1981) and voter fraud (Campbell, 2006), but more recent research suggests that voter fraud has been quite rare in the past decade (Minnite, 2010) and, according to some observers,

voter suppression was less pronounced in 2008 than it had been in 2000 or 2004 (Wang, 2012).

Previous research has demonstrated a sizeable proportion of the U.S. population believes that at least some forms of election fraud occur frequently (Anscombe and Persily, 2007). Yet, we understand far less about the contextual factors shaping individual perceptions, in particular how partisanship shapes individual beliefs about fraud. It is crucial that we understand more about how individuals form their opinions about election fraud. Concerns about election fraud and fairness have been found to undermine legitimate electoral practices (Pastor, 1999), and have been shown to correlate with reduced confidence in democratic institutions both in the U.S. (Gronke and Hicks, 2009) and in comparative research (Birch, 2008). Furthermore, voter perceptions of election fraud are becoming the basis for justifying electoral laws. In *Purcell v. Gonzalez* (2006), for example, the U.S. Supreme Court argued that perceptions of voter fraud were widespread among the electorate and could discourage honest voters from turning out to vote and, as such, steps should be taken to reassure voters of the integrity of elections (Anscombe and Persily, 2007).

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¹ See for example Drum 2012.

While there is little evidence that U.S. elections are plagued by systematic voter fraud or suppression, there is ample evidence of partisan suspicions regarding such practices. Since *Bush v. Gore*, the number of legal challenges to election administration has more than doubled from an average of 100 cases a year before 2000, to an average of more than 230 cases per year (Hasen, 2012), and these cases tend to follow clear partisan divides (Hasen, 2005, 939–940; Tokaji, 2007). Democrats tend to be more supportive of campaigns by organizations such as Human SERVE and ACORN to make voting easier (James, 2011). By contrast, Republicans and conservative media outlets were seen as leading charges that ACORN was committing “voter fraud” with its registration efforts (Drier and Martin, 2010). Three of the states that have passed the most stringent voter identification laws in recent years—Georgia, Indiana, and Missouri—did so in state legislatures dominated by the Republican Party (Tokaji, 2007, 1079), and Democrats and their supporters have challenged these laws in court (Hasen, 2005). But this partisan aspect of election administration is not unique to the United States, comparative studies of electoral governance and democratization have also highlighted the partisan nature of election administration (Lehoucq and Molina, 2002).

This study will enrich our understanding of individual perceptions of election fraud, and the role that partisanship plays in shaping those perceptions. This article also broadens our understanding of election fraud in the U.S., which has focused almost exclusively on forms of election fraud undertaken by voters (here called “voter fraud”) in response to the recent debate about voter identification laws, when comparative research shows that election fraud can also take such forms as voter suppression, or tampering with the vote count (Lehoucq, 2003; Alvarez et al., 2009). This piece also allows us to gauge how concerns about voter fraud compare to concerns about other potential sources of fraud, and how individuals understand the respective incentives of the two parties when it comes to questions of election fraud. Finally, the results presented here offer additional perspective on recent comparative work concerning partisan bias in attitudes toward corruption (Anduiza et al., 2012). Thus, the research presented here stands to contribute both to our understanding of perceptions of fraud in the U.S. and, more generally, to our understanding about the role of partisan identification and incentives in shaping individual perceptions of election fraud and corruption.

This article develops theoretical expectations regarding partisan perceptions of fraud, and reports on findings from a survey experiment in the 2011 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES). By presenting respondents with an election scenario involving either a Democratic or Republican candidate winning, this experiment was designed to investigate partisan influence in fraud assessments, and to increase our understanding of how individuals’ perceptions of voter fraud compare to other sources of fraud. The overall picture of responses to the likeliness of fraud suggest that respondents understand Republicans have incentives to manipulate elections by suppressing voters, while Democrats would be better served to manipulate elections by inflating voter turnout. At the same time,

whether individuals expressed concern about fraud in a given scenario depends heavily on whether the candidate in their scenario was from their party.

This paper further investigates whether such a partisan effect is evidence of ideological commitment, or consistent with the kinds of partisan bias found by Anduiza et al. (2012), and “winner’s effects” found by Llewellyn et al. (2009), where individuals are less concerned about malfeasance if the politician in question belongs to their political party. The findings reported here indicate that the partisan impact of individual concern over election fraud cannot be attributed to ideological commitment, but are suggestive of partisan bias. While some particular scenarios generate more concern about fraud than others, the most substantial effect on respondents’ perceptions of fraud depend on whether the candidate perceived to benefit in the scenario shares the respondents party identification. These findings enrich our understanding of the forces that shape voter confidence in the electoral process and provide an important perspective on how policy-makers should interpret expressions of citizen concern about election fraud. Before turning to these findings about partisanship and perceptions of fraud, however, this article offers a brief overview of what we currently understand about partisanship and election fraud or manipulation at the elite level.

1. Election fraud: perceptions and reality

It should strike most observers of American politics as a fairly non-controversial statement to say that the major political parties in the U.S.—The Republican Party and the Democratic Party—want to win elections. To do so, parties are seen undertaking activities in such broad categories as: persuasion, mobilization, and coordination. Furthermore, some of the activities undertaken in any one of these broad categories might be construed as manipulation motivated by partisan interests. Here, manipulation refers to activities that are not necessarily illegal but are seen as undertaken for the narrow, partisan goal of securing electoral victory, as opposed to actions undertaken in the public interest. And while those activities characterized as “manipulation” may be seen as normatively less desirable than actions undertaken in the public interest, they are still legal activities and, as such, do not necessarily constitute actual fraud.² For example, with respect to persuasion, the political business cycle literature has focused on the ways that incumbent leaders might manipulate macroeconomic policy over the course of an election cycle so as to persuade voters of the leader’s positive impact on the economy.³

Most partisan attempts at manipulation in the U.S. focus on mobilization.⁴ Although scholarly research has debated the partisan implications of voter turnout in the U.S. for

² For more on incumbent strategic manipulation in the comparative context see Beaulieu and Hyde 2009.

³ For an overview of the debate about the political business cycle see Drazen 2001.

⁴ Some might characterize negative campaigning as manipulation of the persuasion aspect of campaigning.

over two decades, most research acknowledges 1) the conventional wisdom that higher turnout favors Democrats, and 2) that political elites' behavior is consistent with conventional wisdom.⁵ As such, we should expect any partisan manipulation to mirror the legal efforts described in the introduction, with Democrats focused on inflating voter turnout as much as possible and Republican attempting voter de-mobilization and voter suppression.

While we may be able to find examples of partisan electoral manipulation, it is important to note that instances of actual election fraud appear to be few and far between these days. In her research on voter fraud, Loraine uncovered 70 federal convictions for election fraud from 2002 to 2005, of which 26 were cases of voter fraud (2010, 227). Even if we allow that there might be more fraud committed than is actually caught, prosecuted, and convicted, each election since 2000 in the United States has seen anywhere from 80 million to 132 million ballots cast, suggesting that instances of election fraud appear to be relatively rare and insignificant to the overall democratic functioning of U.S. elections.⁶

Based on what we know about perceptions of fraud from previous surveys, and the strategic logic that should shape partisan motivations to manipulate elections, this study offers new insights into the circumstances that are likely to shape voter concerns about election fraud. If, for example voters are aware of the conventional wisdom regarding the partisan implications of turnout, we would expect scenarios involving voter suppression to seem more suspicious if they benefit a Republican, whereas scenarios involving voter fraud should be more suspect if they benefit a Democrat. As a point of comparison, scenarios involving electronic voting may be less likely to raise concerns of election fraud, even though some U.S. studies have found voters to lack confidence in electronic voting (Alvarez et al. 2008; Stewart, 2009), because this technology has not presented a clear electoral advantage for either party. From this logic, we can derive the following hypotheses:

H1. Respondents should find fraud more likely in cases where voters are turned away from the polls and a Republican candidate wins.

H2. Respondents should find fraud more likely in cases where ineligible voters are registered and a Democratic candidate wins.

H3. A smaller proportion of respondents should demonstrate concern for fraud in cases of e-voting compared to the other two fraud scenarios.

Beyond these general expectations about how perceptions of fraud might be shaped by the party who is seen as benefitting, how might an individual's own partisan identity further shape their perceptions of fraud? It may be the case that certain fraud scenarios present ideologically

objectionable premises for people with particular partisan attachments. In the case of the fraud scenarios here, Republican respondents may find those scenarios in which people are thought to be registering ineligible voters to be objectionable because it suggests a kind of disregard for law and order. With respect to democratic ideology, it may be that democratic respondents find scenarios suggestive of voter suppression to be objectionable because it suggests behavior that undermines inclusiveness in the democratic process.

Another possibility is that differential exposure to partisan news, and framing effects, might shape individuals' attitudes toward fraud.⁷ Republicans, who are more likely to consume conservative news sources like Fox News have likely had far more exposure to stories of voter fraud, compared to Democrats, who would be more likely to watch a liberal media outlet like MSNBC (Drier and Martin (2010)). Democrats, by contrast are likely to have had exposure to stories about voter suppression, which were common on networks such as MSNBC in recent election cycles.

H4. Individuals who identify as Democrat will find fraud to be more likely in cases where voters were turned away from the polls.

H5. Individuals who identify as Republican will find fraud to be more likely in cases where ineligible voters were rumored to be registered.

Finally, we need to consider that perceptions will change based on the interaction of individual's party ID with the party ID of the candidate perceived as benefitting from the potential fraud. Drawing on the logic of partisan bias (Bartels, 2002), individuals with particular partisan attachments may evaluate the same information differently when the object of question shares their party ID. For example, many studies have found that individuals' assessment of the economy is more positive when the president shares their party ID.⁸ More specific to questions of electoral fairness, using a panel dataset of voters' self-reported confidence in the electoral process both before and after the 2006 election, Lewellyn et al. (2009) find that individuals who voted for the winning candidate are more confident in the accuracy of vote counting, compared to individuals who voted for the losing candidate. More recently, using a survey experiment design in Spain, Anduiza et al. (2012) have found that evaluations of corruption differed depending on whether the politician in question shared the party ID of the survey respondent. It would follow, in this study, that individuals presented with a scenario in which their co-partisan wins would be less likely to suspect fraud than individuals who either don't identify with a party or who are presented with a scenario where a candidate who does not share their party identification wins.

H6. Individuals who identify as either Republican or Democrat will find fraud to be less likely in cases where the candidate perceived to benefit shares their party identification.

⁵ It should be noted that while some research has found support for this conventional wisdom (Radcliff, 1994) other research has found either limited support (Nagel and McNulty, 1996) or has called the conventional wisdom into question (DeNardo, 1980; Martinez and Gill, 2005).

⁶ Turnout average calculated from the United States Election Project. <http://elections.gmu.edu/index.html>.

⁷ For more on framing effects see Druckman 2001.

⁸ For a review of these studies see Gerber and Huber 2009.

It is possible, however, that the impact of co-partisanship might be attenuated by political sophistication, as Anduiza et al. (2012) find to be the case in their recent survey experiment on partisanship and corruption perceptions.

H7. Increased political sophistication will reduce the impact of shared partisan identification on fraud perceptions.

The seven hypotheses detailed in this section will be tested using data from a survey experiment performed as part of the 2011 CCES.

2. A survey experiment on election fraud

In the Fall of 2011, 1000 respondents were asked about their perceptions of election fraud as part of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) administered by YouGov Polimetrix. The CCES uses an internet-based survey platform to field a 30,000 + person national stratified survey, drawing a matched sample from a pool of internet users to approximate nationally representative sample obtained through random-digit dialing (Gerber and Huber, 2010). Half of the questionnaire consists of common content questions. For the other half of the questionnaire, individual institutions design a subset of questions, which are posed to 1000 respondents. Research that has used data from the CCES in the past has reported its sample to be consistent with other national surveys, particularly where party identification and ideology are concerned (Ansalaobehere and Persily, 2007, 1743). Table 1 provides a comparison of the CCES sample used in this survey and the sample used in the 2012 American National Election Study (ANES). Consistent with what other research, Table 1 shows that rates of party identification and political interest are comparable to other nationally representative surveys. Gender proportions are also comparable to the ANES. The CCES sample does differ from the 2012 ANES in that it surveys a higher proportion of older individuals, white non-hispanics, individuals who only have a high school education, and voters (as indicated by voting in 2008).

Table 1
Comparison of descriptive statistics.

	2011 CCES	2012 ANES
Gender		
% Male	47	48
% Female	53	52
Age		
% Respondents under 45	30	40
% Respondents 45–65	52	40
Race		
% Black	11	19
% Latino/Hispanic	7	17
% White	76	73
Education		
% Respondents HS Graduates	35	24
% Respondents with some college	22	33
% Respondents with 4-year college degree	22	19
Politics		
% Always/Mostly interested in politics	54	50
% Voted in 2008	84	77
% Republican	25	23
% Democrat	37	40

The question about fraud was designed as an experiment, with two aspects of the question varied at random, yielding a 2×3 factorial design with six total groups. By assigning these scenarios to respondents at random, we increase the likelihood that individuals within each group are similar across a range of observed and unobserved factors, which will allow us to infer the effect of particular scenarios on individuals' perceptions of fraud. Respondents were told about a general election scenario—references to the “2010 election” and a “nearby state” were included to discourage respondents from attaching this scenario to any actual election events. Two aspects of the scenario were manipulated: 1) some aspect of election administration in the “nearby state” and 2) the party of the candidate who comes from behind to win the election. Fig. 1 provides the specific wording that was used across the six possible scenarios. For each scenario, respondents were asked “how likely do you think it is that fraud was committed in this case?” and given four options to answer: very likely, somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely, very unlikely.

Experimental research designs raise concerns about external validity—whether the results can be generalized beyond the experimental setting (Shadish et al., 2002). To enhance the external validity of this study, three of the most widely publicized concerns about election fraud were chosen for the scenarios: the security of electronic voting machines (“used electronic voting machines for the first time”), voter suppression (“voters turned away from the polls”), and concerns about voter fraud (“rumors of ineligible voters being registered”). Descriptions of these circumstances were constructed to avoid obvious, partisan triggers—such as references to ACORN, or voter suppression—while providing enough of the flavor of prototypical partisan scenarios so that respondents with particular concerns about fraud might recognize the potential implications. The fact that the candidate comes from behind to win was an intentional choice to raise the stakes of the question of fraud, again without indicating fraud explicitly. And while all attempts were made to frame these scenarios neutrally, it must be recognized that the use of the term “fraud” in the question (asking respondents how likely it was that fraud was committed) provides a framing that has been found to increase concerns in a way that a more neutral characterization, such as “irregularities” would not (Ansalaobehere and Persily, 2007, 1747). Since the goal of this study was to gauge individuals’ concerns about fraud, however, this framing was largely unavoidable.

Table 2 displays the proportion of individuals who found fraud “very likely” for each of the six scenarios. The first thing to notice about these results is that for some scenarios nearly one-third of respondents found fraud to be very likely in their given scenario. Overall, respondents presented with the scenario where a nearby state is using electronic voting technology for the first time appeared to generate the least concern, regardless of which candidate wins. Scenarios of voters being turned away from the polls and registration of ineligible voter, by contrast, cause higher rates of respondents to find fraud “very likely”.

The findings regarding ineligible voters, in particular, are consistent with previous surveys asking respondents more general questions related to voter fraud

In an election for the US House of Representatives in 2010 a nearby state used electronic voting machines for the first time. The Democratic candidate in that state, who had been trailing in public opinion polls, ended up winning the election. How likely do you think it is that fraud was committed in this case?

In an election for the US House of Representatives in 2010 many voters were turned away from the polls in a nearby state. The Democratic candidate in that state, who had been trailing in public opinion polls, ended up winning the election. How likely do you think it is that fraud was committed in this case?

In an election for the US House of Representatives in 2010 there were rumors in a nearby state of community organizations attempting to register ineligible voters. The Democratic candidate in that state, who had been trailing in public opinion polls, ended up winning the election. How likely do you think it is that fraud was committed in this case?

In an election for the US House of Representatives in 2010 a nearby state used electronic voting machines for the first time. The Republican candidate in that state, who had been trailing in public opinion polls, ended up winning the election. How likely do you think it is that fraud was committed in this case?

In an election for the US House of Representatives in 2010 many voters were turned away from the polls in a nearby state. The Republican candidate in that state, who had been trailing in public opinion polls, ended up winning the election. How likely do you think it is that fraud was committed in this case?

In an election for the US House of Representatives in 2010 there were rumors in a nearby state of community organizations attempting to register ineligible voters. The Republican candidate in that state, who had been trailing in public opinion polls, ended up winning the election. How likely do you think it is that fraud was committed in this case?

Fig. 1. Provides the wording used in each of the six treatments included in the survey experiment.

(Anscombe and Persily, 2007). Twenty-six percent of respondents in the 2007 CCES survey thought voter fraud in general to be "very common", and in this survey experiment an average of 30% of respondents presented with the "ineligible voters registered" treatment in this survey thought fraud "very likely". These response rates are similar to a 2008 poll by Rasmussen, reporting 23% of likely voters believed "large numbers of people are allowed to vote who are not eligible to vote (Anscombe and Persily, 2007, 1746)".

Table 2
Proportion of Respondents (number) who found fraud "Very Likely" for each Scenario.

	E-Voting	Voters turned away	Ineligible voters registered
Democrat wins	12.79% (22)	30.18% (51)	32.92% (53)
Republican wins	14.7% (25)	32.92% (57)	27.89% (41)

Pearson χ^2 (15) = 67.0146 Pr = 0.000.

Also important to note in Table 2 is that, when we look at the average across all three fraud scenarios, neither party seems to generate more concern about fraud. On average, 25% of respondents found fraud "very likely" both across all six treatments, and within the subset of scenarios involving either Democrats or Republicans. Even though respondents did not attribute more concern about fraud to one party or the other, partisan differences do emerge.

Hypotheses one through three can be evaluated with further examination of the proportions of individuals who found fraud "very likely" in each scenario. Two scenarios in particular generated the highest rates of respondents finding fraud "very likely": the scenario where voters are turned away from the polls and a Republican candidate comes from behind to win, and the scenario where there are rumors of community organizations registering ineligible voters and a Democrat comes from behind to win. Just under one-third of respondents who received those scenarios felt it very likely that fraud had been committed. And

Table 3
Perceptions of fraud, logit analysis.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Education	-0.103* (0.047)	-0.127** (0.049)	-0.128** (0.049)	-0.083 (0.060)
Gender	0.534** (0.139)	0.549** (0.146)	0.547** (0.146)	0.545** (0.146)
Political Interest	0.036 (0.072)	0.049 (0.075)	0.030 (0.088)	0.055 (0.076)
Radio	0.027 (0.141)	0.028 (0.148)	0.028 (0.148)	0.031 (0.148)
TV	-0.217 (0.159)	-0.249 (0.168)	-0.246 (0.168)	-0.252 (0.168)
Democrat	0.063 (0.187)	1.081** (0.228)	1.080** (0.228)	1.079** (0.228)
Republican	0.078 (0.197)	0.955** (0.230)	0.951** (0.230)	0.939** (0.230)
Suppression	0.838** (0.193)	0.882** (0.201)	0.884** (0.201)	0.885** (0.201)
Inflation	0.956** (0.186)	1.037** (0.195)	1.043** (0.196)	1.048** (0.195)
Democratic Candidate	-0.158 (0.135)	0.040 (0.145)	0.040 (0.146)	0.045 (0.146)
Democrat Ideology	-0.011 (0.301)	-0.106 (0.320)	-0.108 (0.320)	-0.099 (0.320)
Republican Ideology	-0.168 (0.357)	0.160 (0.388)	0.166 (0.388)	0.180 (0.390)
Co-Partisan		-1.795** (0.192)	-1.899** (0.321)	-1.357** (0.397)
Co-Partisan*Interest			0.061 (0.151)	
Co-Partisan*Education				-0.129 (0.103)
Constant	-0.454 (0.411)	-0.515 (0.432)	-0.482 (0.440)	-0.680 (0.452)
Pseudo-R ²	0.052	0.124	0.124	0.125
Observations	992	992	992	992

Standard Errors in Parentheses.

**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.

while many respondents also thought fraud to be very likely in the reverse scenarios (suppression when a Democrat wins; and ineligible registration when a Republican wins) the results of a chi-square test suggest that the difference between each cell in this table is statistically significant. As such, we can treat the differences among proportions of respondents finding fraud very likely to suggest a meaningful difference in how various fraud tactics are perceived depending on the party that stands to benefit. These results offer support for Hypotheses 1 and 2.

Furthermore, the proportion of respondents who found fraud "very likely" in the e-voting scenarios were markedly smaller. Looking within those cases where the winning candidate was Republican, the rate of response indicating fraud "very likely" was 18 percentage points lower than the voter suppression scenario. Among those scenarios involving Democratic candidates, the rate of response indicating fraud "very likely" for e-voting was 20 percentage points lower than the voter inflation scenario. These results are supportive of Hypothesis 3 and suggest that voters do not see electronic voting as presenting clear opportunities for manipulation for either party.⁹

Table 3 reports the results of four regressions designed to evaluate individual factors associated with fraud perceptions and conditional effects. Although respondents were presented with four response options, ultimately what is most interesting is whether individuals think fraud is happening or not. So for this portion of the analysis, a dichotomous variable was constructed (*fraud*) where individuals reporting they thought fraud to be "very" or "somewhat" likely received a value of 1, while individuals

perceiving fraud as "very" or "somewhat" unlikely received a value of zero, which allowed for the use of a logistic regression model.¹⁰ Thus, positive coefficients are associated with an increased probability that a respondent would perceive fraud to be likely in their scenario, while negative coefficients indicate a decrease in the probability that a respondent will perceive fraud in their scenario.

Model 1 includes a number of individual characteristics, based on previous survey research investigating perceptions of fraud and the literature on political sophistication. These controls included: education, gender, self-reported interest in politics, and recent radio and television consumption.¹¹ Model 1 also includes controls for the respondent's party identification (*Democrat*, *Republican*) with respondents who identified as independent forming the reference category.¹² The model includes variables indicating which fraud scenario the respondent received: voters turned away from the polls (*Suppression*) or registering ineligible voters (*Inflation*), where the e-voting scenario serves as the reference category. Model 1 also includes variables indicating whether the candidate in the scenario was a Democrat (*Democratic Candidate*) with Republican candidate serving as the reference category.

Model 1 also includes two interaction terms, which allow us to evaluate hypotheses four and five. Here respondent party identification is interacted with the fraud

⁹ All of the results presented in Table 3 are robust to an alternative specification that uses the original 4-category dependent variable and an ordered logistic regression. See Appendix A.

¹⁰ Although certain indicators such as political ideology, age, income, region, and race have been found to have a significant effect on fraud perceptions in other studies (Ansollebehere and Persily, 2007), the experimental design used here appears to have rendered these indicators insignificant for this study, so they were not included in the regression models.

¹¹ Across the sample of 991 respondents, 375 identified as democrat, 251 identified as republican, and 374 identified as independent when presented with those three choices.

⁹ Another possibility, which has been raised recently in the Latin American context (Alvarez et al., 2011), is that voters actually do have more confidence in electronic voting technology, relative to other aspects of the election administration process. If these findings reflect such confidence, it may represent a change over time as individuals in the U.S. become more familiar with the technology.

scenario received, to test whether ideological commitments lead respondents to find particular scenarios objectionable. The variable *Democrat Ideology* captures instances where a Democratic respondent received the voter suppression scenario and *Republican Ideology* indicates instances where a Republican respondent received the voter inflation scenario. If partisanship leads individuals to suspect fraud on the basis of ideological commitment, we would expect these interactions to be related to the probability of finding fraud likely. We should note that the model does not include interactions of the candidate and fraud-type, which would essentially replicate the six treatment categories reported in Table 2. In other analyses where such variables were included, however, the statistical significance reported in Table 2 does not hold at the individual level. So while we find support for Hypotheses one and two in the aggregate, individual-level analysis are not supportive of a statistically significant correspondence between candidate party and fraud type.

In Model 1, the only individual factors associated with a statistically significant change in the probability of finding fraud likely are education and gender. More educated individuals were less likely to perceive fraud in their scenarios, as indicated by the negative coefficient associated with *Education*. Women were more likely to perceive fraud in their scenarios (positive coefficient associated with *Gender*).¹³ In terms of the scenario-specific measures included in Model 1, the party of the winning candidate had no independent effect on respondents' fraud perceptions, but the positive and significant coefficients associated with the *Suppression* and *Inflation* variables suggest that both of these scenarios increased the probability that respondents would find fraud likely, compared to the e-voting scenario. Finally, the fact that the *Democrat Ideology* and *Republican Ideology* coefficients do not obtain conventional levels of statistical significance should lead us to reject hypotheses four and five, and suggests that partisan identification is not having a clear ideological impact on respondents' assessment of fraud.

Model 2 adds an additional term, which allows us to evaluate hypothesis six. This dichotomous variable is an indicator of whether the respondent received a scenario where the candidate who won shared their party identification (*Co-Partisan*).¹⁴ The negative estimated coefficient associated with the *Co-Partisan* variable indicates that respondents who were presented with a scenario where the winner shared their partisan identity (*Co-Partisan* = 1) were less likely to perceive fraud across all scenarios. These partisan effects are statistically significant even when controlling for additional individual-level factors that show statistically significant

relationships to the probability of perceiving fraud in a given scenario. Furthermore, with the *Co-Partisan* variable included, the coefficients associated with respondents' party ID (*Democrat*, *Republican*) attain conventional levels of statistical significance as well.

Because respondent's party ID is one of the variables used to construct the *Co-Partisan* variable, we must interpret their meaning with care. Since *Co-Partisan* captures instances where a Democratic respondent received a scenario with a Democratic candidate winning, and instances where a Republican respondent received a scenario with a Republican candidate winning, *Democrat* now represents instances where a Democratic respondent received a scenario with a Republican candidate winning. Similarly *Republican* now represents instances where a Republican respondent received a scenario with a Democratic Candidate winning. Thus the coefficients associated with these three variables (*Co-Partisan*, *Democrat*, *Republican*) show very clearly that respondents who identify as Democrat or Republican are much more likely to perceive fraud in scenarios where a candidate from the opposing party wins, and far less likely to perceive fraud in scenarios where a candidate from their party wins. These findings provide support for Hypothesis six.

Finally, Models 3 and 4 offer tests of Hypothesis seven, that political sophistication should attenuate the impact of shared partisanship on fraud perceptions. Model 3 proxies political sophistication with our measure of self-reported political interest, and Model 4 uses education. In both cases the estimated coefficient associated with the interaction term indicates what happens to the probability that a respondent who received a co-partisan winner in their scenario suspects fraud, as reported political interest (or education) increases. Neither of these interactions obtains conventional levels of statistical significance—nor does their inclusion significantly alter most of the other relationships from Models 1 and 2. The only exception is the relationship between fraud suspicions and education in Model 4. When we include an interaction term for co-partisanship and education, the estimated coefficient associated with education represents the impact of education where co-partisanship is equal to zero—where an individual did not receive a scenario where the winner shared their partisanship. What we see in Model 4 is that in such cases, although the estimated coefficient is still negative, it no longer obtains statistical significance. This suggests that increased education does not have a strong reductive effect on suspicions of election fraud when "the other guy" is perceived as benefitting.

Fig. 2 displays the substantive effect of the interaction between respondent and candidate partisanship based on Model 2 in Table 3, broken out by the respondent's political party.¹⁵ While the impact of co-partisanship is substantial, there is no statistically significant difference in the impact of partisanship for Republicans compared to Democrats. When a partisan respondent receives a scenario where the

¹³ Women displayed less confidence in the overall fairness of U.S. elections, but since a control for fairness is included in the model, this gender gap warrants further investigation. This finding may relate to the large body of work that finds women in politics are more likely than men to be perceived as honest and trustworthy (McDermott, 1998; Frederick and Sireb, 2008).

¹⁴ Copartisan received a value of 1 if an individual who identified as Democrat received a scenario with a democratic candidate or if an individual who identified as Republican received a scenario with a Republican candidate. The variable received a value of zero otherwise.

¹⁵ Substantive interpretations were calculated using the Margins command in STATA—all other values besides those described in Fig. 2 were held constant at their means.




Fig. 2. The impact of partisanship on the probability of finding fraud likely.

candidate shares their partisanship (*Co-Partisan*) the probability they find fraud somewhat or very likely is 48% for Republicans and 47% for Democrats. In both cases, though, when a partisan respondent receives a scenario with a candidate from the other party, the probability they find likely increases to 82%, an increase of 35% in the probability of finding fraud somewhat or very likely. Furthermore, these predicted probabilities are statistically significant and, although not depicted in the figure, the associated confidence intervals for these predictions are quite narrow and do not overlap. If we look at the minimum shift for a Republican respondent from a co-partisan to a non-co-partisan scenario (from the highest range of the estimated confidence interval for the former, to the lowest range of the confidence interval for the latter), the probability of finding fraud somewhat or very likely still increases by 21%.¹⁶ A similar comparison for Democratic respondents, reveals a minimum increase of 23%.¹⁷

3. Conclusion

The results presented here suggest that political party leaders and candidates may not be the only political actors who care about winning elections. This survey experiment has shown that a substantial proportion of individuals can be motivated to care about fraud, but whether a particular suspicious scenario is likely to provoke concerns about fraud is heavily influenced by partisan considerations. Further investigation suggests that the impact of partisanship is not driven by ideology, but rather a kind of “winners effect” where individuals tend not to be concerned about election integrity if their party benefits from potential fraud.

As the CCES sample tends to underrepresent low-income minorities and non-voters, we must take care in the broader conclusions we draw from the results presented here.¹⁸

¹⁶ Confidence interval for Republican/Copartisan: 40%–55%; Confidence interval for Republican/non-copartisan: 76%–87%.

¹⁷ Confidence interval for Democrat/Copartisan: 40%–53%; Confidence interval for Democrat/non-copartisan: 77%–87%.

¹⁸ See Ansolabehere and Persily (2007) for more on the representativeness of the CCES sample.

Although race was not found to be a statistically significant predictor of fraud perceptions in this sample, we should allow for the possibility that a survey including more low-income minority respondents would change the influence of race as an individual predictor of fraud perceptions. With respect to the over-sample of voters in this survey, given that current concerns about Americans’ perceptions of election fraud have been related explicitly to the impact that such concerns might have on voter turnout, the underrepresentation of non-voters should be less problematic than the underrepresentation of low-income minorities.¹⁹

Within the context of U.S. electoral politics and election fraud, respondents in this survey see attempts at voter suppression to be just as problematic as attempts at illegitimate voter inflation. Future research should explore the conceptual links between voters being turned away from the polls and the impact of voter ID laws. But, to the extent that people perceive voter suppression to be a problem and believe that more stringent identification requirements will result in some measure of voter suppression, they are only likely to perceive such actions as fraudulent when their party does not benefit. Thus, the claim by those who favor more stringent voter ID laws that such regulation will increase voter confidence in the electoral process is contingent on the impact of partisanship. As to the issue of citizen perceptions informing government policy on elections, this survey shows clearly that rather than representing some pure ideological commitment to particular electoral practices or procedures, individuals’ perceptions are heavily influenced by their own partisan attachments. As such any argument based on public perceptions of fraud should be interpreted as an argument about partisan attachment as much as an argument about actual electoral practices that may or may not be fraudulent.

Considering these results in a broader, comparative context, it is clear that individuals’ perceptions of fraud must be understood to be shaped by partisan attachment. Like recent work on perceptions of corruption (Anduiza et al., 2012), party identification will shape the circumstances under which individuals are likely to take issue with election integrity. Unlike that recent work, which found that the impact of partisan bias was moderated by the respondent’s political sophistication, no such attenuating effects were uncovered in this study. Future research, then, should investigate those factors that might further condition the ways that party ID shapes individuals’ perceptions of fraud. In terms of broader policy implications, these findings suggest that an emphasis on technological solutions to election fraud may not be as effective at increasing voter confidence in elections as policy measures to limit opportunities for partisan influence in the process of election administration.

Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary data related to this article can be found at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2014.03.003>

¹⁹ Unless we think that non-voters are systematically disinclined to vote because of attitudes about election fraud.

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**Plaintiff Exhibit
PL1157**

FILED UNDER SEAL

From: Eric Opiela [eopiela@ericopiela.com]
Sent: Friday, November 19, 2010 6:39 AM
To: Gerardo Interiano
Cc: 'Lisa Kaufman'
Subject: Re: useful metric

Happy to. Thanks Gerardo. Think of as "OHRVS" Optimal Hispanic Republican Voting Strength....a measure of how Hispanic, and Republican at the same time we can make a particular census block.

On Nov 19, 2010, at 6:17 AM, Gerardo Interiano wrote:

> I will gladly help with this Eric, but you're going to have to explain
> to me in layman's terms. Maybe you and I can sit down and go through
> this and you can show me exactly what you want next week or after Thanksgiving.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Eric Opiela [mailto:eopiela@ericopiela.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, November 17, 2010 10:19 PM
> To: Gerardo Interiano
> Cc: Lisa Kaufman
> Subject: useful metric
>
> Just had a thought I needed to get out before I forgot it. The raw
> data to calculate this is going to be in the PL 94-171 dataset we'll
> get in March (hopefully), but it would be really useful for someone to
> go in and calculate a ratio for every census block in the state of
> CVAP/Total Population, a ratio of Hispanic CVAP/Total Hispanic
> Population, a ratio of Spanish Surname RV/Hispanic CVAP, and a ratio
> of Spanish Surname RV/Total Hispanic Population (these last two have
> to be calculated with the voter file overlaid with census data). It
> also would be good to calculate a Spanish Surname Turnout/Total
> Turnout ratio for the 2006-2010 General Elections for all VTDs (I
> already have the data for this for 2006-2008 in a spreadsheet, just
> need to gather it for every VTD for 2010). These metrics would be
> useful in identifying a "nudge factor" by which one can analyze which
> census blocks, when added to a particular district (especially 50+1
> minority majority districts) help pull the district's Total Hispanic
> Pop and Hispanic CVAPs up to majority status, but leave the Spanish
> Surname RV and TO the lowest. This is especially valuable in shoring
> up Canseco and Farenthold. =
>

THE STATE OF TEXAS
v. UNITED STATES et al.
Case No. 11-CV-1303

DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT

DX304


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Coleman Bazelon, Ph.D.

Summary Of Conclusions


- A disproportionate share of registered voters who will need a new ID to continue to be able to vote under SB 14 are African American.
- Acquiring an ID for the purpose of voting, including a nominally free ID, comes with real economic costs.
- The burden of the costs imposed by SB 14 is substantially higher for African-American Texans, who are disproportionately poorer, than for white Texans.

Share Of Registered Voters Who Must Obtain SB 14 ID – By Race




Source: Amended Expert Report of Coleman Bazelon, Table 1

Odds Ratio Likelihood Of Needing To Obtain SB 14-Compliant ID In Order To Vote In Person



Source: Reply Report of Coleman Bazelon, ¶34

Minorities Are Disproportionately Impacted By SB 14 ID Requirement



Source: Calculation from Amended Expert Report of Coleman Bazelon, Table 1

Illustrative Example Of Travel Mode Choice And Cost Calculation

Table 4: Illustrative Example of Travel Mode Choice and Cost Calculation

Hypothetical Voter African American Wage = \$13.03 DPS Location		
1	2	3

Taxi

Travel Time (minutes)	10	9	12
Value of Time (\$)	\$2.17	\$1.95	\$2.61
Fare (\$)	\$14.50	\$13.25	\$17.00
Total (\$)	\$16.67	\$15.20	\$19.61

Walk

Travel Time (minutes)	150	135	180
Value of Time (\$)	\$32.58	\$29.32	\$39.09
Fare (\$)	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
Total (\$)	\$32.58	\$29.32	\$39.09

Public Transit

Travel Time (minutes)	42	51	44
Value of Time (\$)	\$9.12	\$11.03	\$9.64
Fare (\$)	\$4.10	\$4.54	\$4.22
Total (\$)	\$13.22	\$15.57	\$13.86


Costs To Obtain An EIC

Hypothetical African-American Registered Voter

- Travel Costs = **\$27.46**
- One hour spent at DPS = **\$13.03**
- One hour spent acquiring birth certificate = **\$13.03**
- Birth certificate fees (mail-in application) = **\$22**
- Partial day of child care services = **\$11**

Total Costs = \$86.52

SB 14 – Significance Of The Level Of Costs



African American Texans Have Lower Incomes Than White Texans

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Table 7: Texas Household Income by Race

State of Texas 2010	African American		White	
	[1]	\$ 31,104	\$	52,392
\$21,288 less than White Texans				
Median Household Income	[1]	\$ 31,104	\$	52,392
% Difference with White	[2]		68.4%	
Total Number of Households	[3]		263	1,087
Households below White Median	[4]		181	
Households below White Median (%)	[5]		68.8%	

African American Texans Have Lower Wealth Than White Texans

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Table 8: Texas Household Wealth by Race

State of Texas 2010	African American		White	
	[1]	\$ 11,961	\$	97,800
\$85,839 less than White Texans				
Median Household Wealth	[1]	\$ 11,961	\$	97,800
% Difference with White	[2]		717.7%	
Total Number of Households	[3]		263	1,087
Households below White Median	[4]		217	
Households below White Median (%)	[5]		82.5%	

African-American Texans Are More Likely To Be Poor Than White Texans

Table 9: Texas Poverty Status by Race

	African American	White	% Difference Between White and African American
At or Above the Poverty Line	2,046,954	77%	10,061,576
Below the Poverty Line	627,862	23%	956,513

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2006-2010 American Community Survey

African-American Texans Score Lower On Other Measures Of Socioeconomic Status Than White Texans

Table 10: Texas Employment Status by Race

	African American	White	
Employed	1,186,242	88%	5,627,211 95%
Unemployed	158,430	12%	317,602 5%
% Difference Between White and African American Unemployment			

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2006-2010 American Community Survey

Table 11: Texas Education Attainment by Race

	No High School Diploma	No Undergraduate Degree	
African American	260,738	16%	977,674 58%
White	688,064	9%	4,011,559 51%
% Difference Between White and African American Educational Attainment		-7%	-8%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2006-2010 American Community Survey

African American Texans Are Required To Expend A Share Of Wealth That Is More Than Four Times Higher Than The Share Required For White Texans

